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Post-identification feedback (PIF) occurs when witnesses are given feedback following their 
identification choices. This feedback has been shown to alter witnesses’ retrospective judgments 
regarding their witnessing experience (e.g., they are more confident that they made a correct 
identification). PIF effects are robust; they impact witnesses’ memory of their experience, and 
also appear to act as confirmation to jurors who are asked to assess witness reliability. A current 
recommendation for eyewitness procedures is that identifications should be recorded and shown 
to jurors at trial, but this might be harmful if jurors are also negatively impacted by this 
suggestive feedback. The goal of the current study was to further evaluate how PIF can impact 
jurors’ assessments of witnesses. Across two experiments, I failed to find evidence that viewing 
eyewitnesses receiving PIF impacted mock-jurors’ perceptions of the witness or of their own 
performance. Additionally, the presence of PIF warnings in Experiment 2 did not impact 
participants’ perceptions of either the witness or their own performance. Given the recent push 
for videotaped identification procedures, the findings from these studies are timely and beneficial 
to the legal system.  
1 
Introduction 
Eyewitness testimony is an important component in legal proceedings, however, both real 
world cases and laboratory studies have revealed that these identifications are not always 
accurate (Wells, 1993). To date, DNA evidence has exonerated 361 innocent individuals from 
serving time for crimes that they did not commit. Of these wrongful convictions, 70% involved 
at least one instance of mistaken identification (innocenceproject.org, accessed 2019). Myriad 
factors can contribute to wrongful witness identifications. The purpose of the proposed studies 
was to evaluate this problem at a broader scale. Specifically, the current study explored how 
jurors interpret eyewitness evidence and incorporate that information when assessing the witness. 
When considering the nature of mistaken eyewitness identifications in wrongful convictions, the 
issue is truly a two-stage problem for the legal system. First, the witness erroneously identifies 
an innocent individual. Second, jurors find the witness believable and find their testimony to be 
credible. The current studies explored factors that may influence jurors as they evaluate trial 
evidence. 
Eyewitness identification 
Eyewitnesses are one of many types of evidence that can be presented during legal 
proceedings. Fortunately, there has been a plethora of research conducted that has focused on 
exactly how different factors can impact eyewitness accuracy (Wells & Olson, 2003).  These 
factors are commonly classified into two categories: estimator and system variables (Wells, 
1978). Estimator variables are factors that are not under the control of the legal system (e.g., the 
age of a witness, the viewing conditions the witness had, delay between crime and 
identification). Alternatively, system variables are factors that are within the control of the legal 
system (e.g., type of lineup administered, utilizing expert witnesses, lineup composition). There 
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has been substantial information acquired from investigations of both system and estimator 
variables. For example, research on estimator variables has shown eyewitness performance can 
be impaired when witnesses did not have a good opportunity to view the culprit (Ellis, Davies, & 
Shepherd, 1977), when the witness is a different race from the culprit (Meissner & Brigham, 
2001), when a weapon is present (Steblay, 1992), and when there is a longer delay between the 
crime event and when witnesses are questioned about it (Lipton, 1977). Although these are 
things that cannot be controlled by the legal system, knowledge of how these factors come into 
play in a specific crime event can help evaluators know when identifications may be more or less 
likely to be accurate. 
System variables on the other hand, can arguably serve two roles. First, they can inform 
law officials regarding what are best practice guidelines. Second, they can help evaluators 
recognize the dangers (e.g., to identification accuracy) when these guidelines are not followed. 
Research has shed light onto numerous factors that can aid in eyewitness accuracy. For example, 
warning witnesses that a culprit may or may not be in the lineup (Malpass & Devine, 1981), 
making sure all lineup members are physically similar to the suspect (Lindsay & Wells, 1980), 
and using simultaneous lineups (Neuschatz, Wetmore, Key, Cash, Gronlund, & Goodsell, 2016) 
have all been shown to result in higher rates of witness accuracy. An additional factor to consider 
is that of either unconscious or conscious behavioral influence. Prior research has demonstrated 
that lineup administrators can use both verbal and nonverbal cues to suggest a specific suspect to 
the eyewitness (Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999; Wells, 1993). An additional danger 
is that this information can be conveyed either intentionally or unintentionally (as demonstrated 
in Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001) to the witness. In this manner, the behavior of the lineup 
administrator can influence the eyewitness’s decision. One solution to this is to make sure the 
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lineup administrator does not know the identity of the suspect. This is referred to as a double-
blind lineup, where neither the witness nor the lineup administrator have knowledge of who the 
suspect is (Wells & Luus, 1990). Specifically, the witness should only rely on their memory, and 
not have any indication about who the police most suspect. Wells and Luus (1990) argued that 
this approach is similar to the recommendation that researchers should not know what condition 
participants are in order to avoid influencing the results of a study (Rosenthal, 1976). In this 
view, the identification procedure can be seen as analogous to a study where the police officer 
has a hypothesis that the suspect is a culprit. They test this hypothesis by presenting a lineup to a 
witness, where an identification (or lack thereof) can provide evidence to support (or refute) that 
claim. Although the difference in witness accuracy as a function of double- versus single-blind 
(only the witness does not know who the suspect is) lineup administration remains relatively 
understudied, laboratory studies confirm that single-blind methods lead to more erroneous 
identifications (Perlini & Silvaggio, 2007; Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1991). 
Additionally, the recommendation to employ double blind lineup administration is strongly 
encouraged by researchers (Wells, 1993; Wells & Seelau, 1995; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, 
Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998) and governing bodies alike (Technical Working Group, 1999). 
This notion highlights the danger that witnesses may not be solely incorporating information 
from the crime scene, but may also be including information that they obtain after the event 
occurs – for better or worse. 
Eyewitness suggestibility 
Contrary to the popular conceptualization that memory is like a video camera, research in 
both the basic and applied literatures have shown that memory is malleable (Loftus, 2005; 
Schacter, 2001). This reconstructive nature of memory also extends to witnesses’ memory for a 
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crime. For example, in a series of highly influential studies, Loftus showed how eyewitness 
reports could be altered by information provided after an event had occurred (also known as the 
misinformation effect). Her novel paradigm had participants view a short film of an automobile 
accident. After, participants were asked follow up questions about the event where some 
participants were asked “how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other” while 
other participants saw other verbs such as bumped or hit instead. When participants provided 
their speed estimates, participants who had received the smashed verb provided higher speed 
judgments than did those who saw the bumped or hit verbs (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). 
Additionally, Loftus also demonstrated that memory for details could be altered by post-event 
information. For example, Loftus found that participants would report different colored vehicles 
(Loftus, 1975), report having seen a barn that was never present (Loftus, 1975), and report 
having seen a stop sign when they had actually seen a yield sign (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) 
when leading questions suggested these pieces of information to be factual.  
In addition to being a heavily documented phenomenon, there are also well known 
factors that can influence the strength of these effects. For example, having a longer delay 
between the original event and the post-event information presentation increases the 
misinformation effect (Loftus, Miller, Burns, 1978). Furthermore, when the post-event 
information comes from a more credible source, it is much more likely to be incorporated than 
when the information comes from a less credible source (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Underwood 
& Pezdek, 1998). Age has also been shown to impact susceptibility, with younger children and 
older adults being more prone to these memorial inaccuracies (Davis & Loftus, 2005; Roediger 
& Geraci, 2007). However, the misinformation effect has been shown to be mitigated when 
participants are able to recognize inconsistencies between their memory and that of the post-
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event information (Putnam, Sungkhasettee, & Roediger, 2017; Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 
1986). 
The theoretical underpinnings of the misinformation account have been an area that has 
received some debate. Loftus had initially posited that the misinformation effect was due to a 
destructive updating process (Loftus, 1979; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). Specifically, when 
participants are exposed to the misleading post-event information, the novel information 
overrides the original, and deletes that information from memory. McCloskey and Zaragoza 
(1985) argued for an alternate explanation of misinformation effects. Specifically, they noted that 
the phenomenon may not be due to memory deletion, but rather that the memory for that specific 
information may or may not be there to begin with. Their argument centered on the notion that 
participants may not have encoded the detail (e.g., stop sign) at all, therefore, when participants 
select the misleading detail (e.g., yield sign), this is because the post-event information served to 
fill in a memorial gap for the participants. This notion was supported by using what they termed 
a Modified Test procedure to examine the misinformation effect. In their study, participants saw 
an office theft where there was a handyman who was seen holding a hammer. Participants in the 
experimental condition were then given the incorrect misinformation that the handyman was 
holding a screwdriver instead. Participants were then either given the Standard or Modified test 
where they chose between the original and a novel item (hammer vs. wrench). The results 
revealed that participants in the experimental condition were just as likely to select the original 
item as were participants in the control condition (who had not been exposed to the misleading 
information). These findings suggest that these original memories are not necessarily deleted and 
that there are alternative explanations to the misinformation effect.   
6 
The extensiveness of the misinformation effect has been shown to be quite broad, with 
research showing that people can have false childhood memories implanted of them having been 
hospitalized (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995), that they had been lost in a mall (Loftus, 
Coan, & Pickrell, 1996), that they had been attacked by an animal (Porter, 1998), or even that 
they had seen a demonic possession (Guiliana, Mazzoni, Loftus,& Kirsch, 2001). However, these 
real-world applications are not only limited to events from long ago, where memory could be 
poor. Morgan et al. (2007; 2011) demonstrated that misinformation effects occur for members of 
the military who attended “survival schools” that train them to deal with the stresses that they 
would face if being captured as a prisoner of war. In these studies, participants were susceptible 
to various contaminants of memory for the event, which led to them mistakenly identifying the 
person who assaulted them earlier.  
Taken as a whole, this literature further cements the notion that memories are not 
infallible and that post-event information can lead witnesses astray. These studies document how 
memory for an event can be altered or even created and show how a particular word or leading 
question can alter memory. Another way that witnesses can be exposed to suggestive statements 
can pertain to indicators of accuracy given after they make an identification (e.g., “You correctly 
identified the suspect”). This is known as the Post-identification feedback (PIF) effect. 
Post-identification feedback 
Post-identification feedback is a well-studied phenomenon within the legal system, with 
research on the topic spanning over 15 years (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014). PIF occurs 
when a witness to a crime is given some sort of feedback after making an identification decision 
pertaining to the accuracy of their choice (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; 1999). Although post-
identification feedback does not contribute to wrongful identifications, it makes the witness 
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considerably more confident in their identification accuracy. This effect is not only limited to 
laboratory participants, but has also been observed for actual witnesses and victims in real crimes 
(Wright & Skagerberg, 2007). 
The danger posed by PIF has recently been acknowledged by the Oregon Supreme Court, 
which has now switched the burden of proof from the defense to prove that an eyewitness 
identification is inaccurate, to the prosecution to prove that it is admissible. Oregon now notes 
PIF as one factor that can negatively impact eyewitness reliability. “Confirming feedback, by 
definition, takes place after an identification and thus does not affect the result of the 
identification itself. It can, however, falsely inflate witness confidence in the reports they tender 
regarding many of the factors commonly used by courts and jurors to gauge eyewitness 
reliability. As a result, the danger of confirming feedback lies in its potential to increase the 
appearance of reliability without increasing reliability itself” (Oregon v. Lawson, 2012, p. 21). 
In the seminal study examining PIF, Wells and Bradfield (1998) presented mock-
witnesses with either confirming (“Good, you identified the actual suspect”) or disconfirming 
(“Actually, the suspect is number _”) feedback prior to asking them to provide confidence 
judgments regarding their identification choice. It is important to note that this study utilized a 
target-absent lineup, so any identification made by participants was inaccurate. The results 
revealed that participants who received confirming PIF were significantly more confident in their 
decision than were participants who did not receive feedback. The inverse was seen for 
participants who received the disconfirming PIF, as they reported lower confidence ratings. Not 
only did this feedback impact ratings of confidence, but these effects also extended into other 
judgments participants made regarding their witnessing experience. Specifically, confirming and 
disconfirming PIF increased and decreased, respectively, participants’ judgments of how much 
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attention they paid to the event, how willing to testify they would be, how easy or difficult it was 
to make their identification, and how much information they had to base their identification 
decision on. Confirming PIF (but not disconfirming) also impacted additional judgments. 
Participants felt that they had a better view of the crime, took less time to make an identification, 
should be trusted, and were able to make out more facial details. These findings demonstrate two 
important facts. First, judgments that individuals make retrospectively about their memories can 
be influenced by information obtained after the event occurs, and second, the effect of this 
information can extend broadly into other retrospective judgments pertaining to the event. An 
area in the basic literature that is similar to this phenomenon is the hindsight bias or the “knew it 
all along” effect (Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Wood, 1978). 
The hindsight bias is typically evaluated by providing outcome information to people 
who are then asked if they would have been able to predict the outcome if they were not initially 
given that information (Fischhoff, 1977). The finding is that largely, people are prone to 
overestimate the likelihood that they could have predicted the outcome. However, the hindsight 
bias is also observed when individuals’ memory for their initial predictions are altered to match 
the new outcome information (Fischhoff, 1977). In one of the earlier studies on the hindsight 
bias, Fischhoff (1977) presented general knowledge questions to participants. Some of these 
participants were in the memory condition, where they were asked to answer the questions, were 
then provided the correct answers, and then asked to recall the answers they had given earlier. 
Alternatively, other participants were assigned to the hypothetical group who were given the 
correct answers and then asked to indicate if they would have answered the question correctly. 
Participants in the hypothetical group were more likely to overestimate their accuracy compared 
to a control condition that actually answered the questions. Furthermore, participants in the 
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memory group were more likely to misremember their original judgments as having been more 
accurate than they truly were. These findings demonstrate that the hindsight bias not only 
impacts retrospective judgments of performance, but also distorts individuals’ memory for how 
they actually performed on a task.  
The hindsight bias has been a topic of considerable investigation and has been shown to 
be a robust effect that is not easily negated (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990 for a review). One 
explanation for hindsight bias effects is that the hindsight bias produces a narrow top-down 
processing approach, where individuals spend more time reasoning why one option is correct 
rather than considering all of the potential options (Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977). This explanation 
has also been incorporated into the overconfidence literature by Koriat, Lichtenstein, and 
Fischhoff (1980), who argued that overconfidence is a product of individuals trying to justify a 
single choice option while failing to do so for the alternative options. This notion was supported 
in their study where participants were asked to answer general knowledge questions using one of 
two methods. Participants were first given “control” instructions, which were to choose the 
correct answer and rate the probability that their answer was correct. Participants were then 
given a second set of questions and instructed to provide reasons for and against each answer 
option. Participants using the latter set of instructions provided the highest calibration of 
accuracy in their judgments compared to when they were not asked to consider reasons favoring 
and opposing all answer options. Furthermore, the hindsight bias has been shown to occur in a 
multitude of applied decision-making domains, such as gambling behavior (Baboushkin, 
Hardoon, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2001), medical diagnoses (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & 
Harkness, 1981), economics (Holzl, Kirchler, & Rodler, 2002), and jury decision-making 
(Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999). Bradfield and Wells (2005) provided an important extension 
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to this literature by demonstrating that the effects of the hindsight bias are broad and not only 
impact judgments of how certain participants were that they were accurate, but also judgments 
pertaining to factors such as how long it took them to provide a decision, how good of a basis 
they had for their decision, etc. 
While confirmatory PIF may harm eyewitnesses by giving them hindsight bias, its 
deleterious effects are magnified when considered in conjunction with the Biggers’ criteria (Neil 
v. Biggers, 1972). In this case, the U.S. Supreme court listed a set of criteria that jurors should 
utilize when evaluating eyewitness testimony: 1) jurors should consider the witness’ view of the 
culprit, 2) jurors should consider the amount of attention that the witness paid to both the crime 
and culprit, 3), how accurate the description that the witness provided was, 4) how certain the 
eyewitness is in their identification, 5) how much time had passed between the crime and the 
identification. Unfortunately, confirming feedback alters judgments for 3 of the 5 mentioned 
criteria (see Table 1). Adding an additional complication to jury decision-making, research 
conducted on how jurors assess witnesses has revealed that more confident eyewitnesses are 
judged to be much more compelling and accurate by mock-jurors (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 
1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981). Although high confidence is 
usually indicative of accuracy when judgments are collected immediately and in optimal 
witnessing conditions (Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 
2017), the confidence estimates assessed by jurors are given at trial, which is far removed from 
the immediate assessments that have been shown to be accurate. The implications of these 
findings are that confirming PIF will result in the witness appearing to be more accurate in the 
absence of any true increase in the likelihood of an accurate identification. Indeed, research has 
found that witnesses who receive confirming feedback are assessed as more credible compared 
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to witnesses who do not receive PIF (Douglass, Neuschatz, Imrich, & Wilkinson, 2009; Smalarz 
& Wells, 2014).  
Table 1. Effect of PIF on Biggers’ criteria items. 
Criterion Effect of PIF 
View of culprit Increased 
Degree of witness's attention Increased 
Accuracy of culprit's description No effect 
Level of certainty Increased 
Time between crime and ID No effect 
 
Additional research on these statements has afforded further insight into the parameters 
involved in altering witnesses retrospective judgments. For example, it is not necessary that the 
feedback be given immediately after an identification. Studies providing the feedback after a 48 
hour delay still demonstrate the feedback effect (Wells, Charman, Olson, 2003). Additionally, 
the issue of PIF is persistent, such that the feedback effect is seen even when participants are 
asked to provide retrospective judgments a week after receiving the PIF (Neuschatz et al., 2005). 
Even more innocuous or ambiguous statements such as “You have been a great witness” have 
been shown to produce the PIF effect (Dysart, Lawson, & Rainey, 2012).  Furthermore, these 
feedback effects are seen in children (Hafstad, Memon, Logie, 2004), elderly witnesses 
(Neuschatz et al., 2005), for both target present and target absent lineups (Semmler, Brewer, & 
Wells, 2004), regardless of identification procedures (e.g., simultaneous lineup, sequential 
lineup, showup; Douglass, McQuiston-Surrett, 2006; Key, Wetmore, Cash, Neuschatz, & 
Gronlund, 2017), and regardless of lineup instructions (i.e., biased or unbiased; Semmler, 
Brewer, Wells, 2004). Moreover, these statements need not come from a police officer; research 
has shown that confirmatory feedback from jailhouse informants and co-witnesses also provide 
the same PIF effect (Erickson, Lampinen, Wooten, Wetmore, & Neuschatz, 2016; Mote, 
Neuschatz, Bornstein, Wetmore, & Key, 2018; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). Neuschatz et al. 
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(2005) tested the trace strength hypotheses (Brainerd & Reyna, 1988) and the accessibility 
hypothesis (Wells, Charman, & Olson, 2003) by examining how PIF would impact elderly 
eyewitnesses. These two hypotheses make differential predictions. The trace strength hypothesis 
predicts that older adult witnesses should be more susceptible to PIF than younger witnesses 
because older adults have weaker memory traces (Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001). Alternatively, 
the accessibility hypothesis does not predict age differences because this account predicts that 
after time has passed, people cannot remember information pertaining to the quality of their 
memory at the time they made an identification. The results from this study were in line with the 
accessibility hypothesis, as both younger and older adults were similarly influenced by the PIF, 
which the authors view as a testament to how powerful the PIF effect is. Specifically, the 
diagnostic cues that usually are present and benefit younger adults compared to older adults are 
not available to avoid susceptibility to PIF. 
The robustness of PIF effects has been documented by two meta-analyses (Douglass & 
Steblay, 2006; Steblay, Wells, & Douglass; 2014). In the most recent meta-analysis, 23 PIF 
studies were evaluated and results revealed how heavily the presence of PIF impacts 
retrospective judgments. Eleven of the 13 factors (see Table 2) assessed were rated as being 
significantly higher in conditions where inaccurate participants received PIF as opposed to those 
who did not, suggesting that these mock-witnesses felt that they had a better witnessing 
experience than those who did not receive the statement. Additionally, the Cohen’s D values for 
these significant factors ranged from .48 to .98, demonstrating that this is not a small effect. An 
equally important question is whether PIF also impacts accurate witnesses and the analyses 
revealed that the answer is yes, but to a smaller degree. Specifically, PIF given to accurate 
witnesses resulted in witnesses providing higher ratings for 10 of the 13 dependent measures, but 
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to a lesser extent than that of inaccurate witnesses. Between both accurate and inaccurate 
witnesses, assessments pertaining to duration of viewing time and distance measures were 
revealed to not be impacted by PIF.  Although it might be initially surprising, it is possible that 
the reason for their departure from the traditional PIF effect might be due to the nature of the 
judgment being made. All affected judgments pertain to subjective experiences of the witness. 
However, viewing time and distance could be argued as being more “objective” experiences that 
may make them immune to the PIF statements. Additionally, while the more subjective 
judgments may be difficult for participants to access when they provide their ratings, witnesses 
may have a more concrete memorial representation of duration and distance.  
Although meta-analyses can reveal whether effects are reliable across many studies, there 
are important limitations to consider. One issue that meta-analyses face is the type of stimuli that 
are utilized. Specifically, when a meta-analysis is comprised of studies with a restricted range of 
materials, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions regarding whether the effect is truly there or 
an artifact of the materials used. This issue is one that is prevalent within the PIF literature. As 
noted by Steblay et al. (2014), about half of the published PIF studies use either the “bomber on 
the roof” or the “Target store security” videos. In addition to the more commonly used “bomber 
on the roof” and “Target store security” videos, there are eight additional videos and one live 
event that are also used within the literature. Although the studies using the latter, less traditional 
stimuli produce similarly robust effects, the limited set of stimuli is a factor that can hinder meta-
analyses. Another factor that can limit inferences from meta-analyses is the consistency (or lack 
thereof) of manipulations across the studies. A rigorous and diverse literature can help meta-
analyses provide insight into the boundary conditions of different phenomena. In the PIF 
literature, however, most studies included in the meta-analysis used only two types of feedback, 
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with lineup administrators either providing feedback to witnesses or telling them that a high 
number of other witnesses identified the same person as them. While this provides important 
insight, it remains to be determined whether other types of feedback would yield similar PIF 
effects. A final consideration pertains to the availability of studies that are included in meta-
analyses. Publication is biased toward papers with statistically reliable results, such that null 
results are rarely published. As a result, the papers available to include in meta-analyses likely 
represent a biased sample of the total evidence, with many null findings locked in the proverbial 
“file drawer.” Simonsohn et al. (2014) recently developed a method to determine whether the p-
values in the reported literature are distributed in such a way that implies publication bias (e.g., 




Table 2. Effect sizes for the impact of PIF on various factors. Table adapted from Steblay, Wells, 
& Douglass (2014). * denotes significant differences between the PIF and no PIF conditions.  
 
Dependent Measure Culprit k D 
Certainty 
Present 8 .47* 
Absent 19 .98* 
Willingness 
Present 7 .54* 
Absent 17 .98* 
Basis 
Present 7 .54* 
Absent 17 .90* 
Ease 
Present 7 .45* 
Absent 17 .86* 
Memory Clarity 
Present 6 .40* 
Absent 15 .69* 
Trust 
Present 1 .47* 
Absent 5 .69* 
Facial Details 
Present 7 .44* 
Absent 17 .65* 
View 
Present 7 .49* 
Absent 19 .58* 
Time to ID 
Present 7 0.10 
Absent 17 .54* 
Memory for Faces 
Present 7 .18* 
Absent 16 .52* 
Attention 
Present 7 .29* 
Absent 18 .48* 
Viewing Times 
Present 2 0.16 
Absent 7 0.04 
Viewing Distance 
Present 3 0.20 
Absent 10 0.00 
 
Within the PIF literature, there have also been attempts to reduce or eliminate the harmful 
effect of these suggestive statements. However, to date, these attempts have produced mixed 
results. Some of these attempts include obtaining confidence before providing the feedback (also 
known as confidence prophylactic). For example, some suggest obtaining the witness’s 
confidence statement before the lineup administrator provides any feedback to the witness 
(although ideally, no feedback should be provided at any point by the administrator; Wells & 
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Bradfield, 1998). The confidence prophylactic did appear to reduce the impact of PIF for some 
of the aforementioned retrospective judgments (i.e., view, basis for identification, willingness to 
testify, and the trust they would place in another witness with the same viewing conditions; 
Wells & Bradfield, 1998), but did not negate the impact of PIF following a one-week delay 
between participants providing their confidence ratings and receiving the feedback (Neuschatz et 
al., 2007).  Additionally, asking witnesses to consider their retrospective judgments (e.g., view, 
attention, basis, etc.) individually reduced the effects of feedback, but only when participants 
considered these factors before receiving the feedback. When feedback was presented first, the 
effects of PIF were still observed (Wells & Bradfield, 1998). 
Elicitation of suspicion has been another way that researchers have sought to reduce the 
harmful effects of PIF. Neuschatz et al. (2007) found that prompting suspicion pertaining to the 
investigator providing feedback did negate the impact of PIF and this pattern was observed even 
after a week delay between the PIF and retrospective judgments. In this study, participants were 
told that the person who provided the confirming feedback worked for a District Attorney’s 
office to try prove the accuracy of eyewitness testimony and that this person told everyone they 
were accurate. Participants who received this additional information did not show the typical 
boost in retrospective judgments, suggesting that having witnesses wary of potential motivations 
may be a promising avenue in reducing the harmful effects of PIF. 
Finally, a reasonable and important question is whether it is possible to warn witnesses 
about feedback to reduce its impact on retrospective judgments. In a series of four studies, 
Lampinen et al. (2007) found mixed results with regard to being able to successfully warn 
witnesses about relying on confirming feedback. In Experiments 1 and 2, the researchers tested 
this notion conceptually: Prior to providing retrospective judgments, participants were told that 
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all feedback was randomly generated, not an indication of their performance, and should be 
discarded. Participants were then asked to provide their retrospective judgments pertaining to 
their witnessing experience. In these studies, participants did not demonstrate the typical 
feedback effects, suggesting that witnesses are able to discount the unreliable feedback to some 
extent. However, Experiments 3 and 4 did not observe a similar pattern with regard to 
participants discrediting the feedback. The goal of Experiments 3 and 4 was to move this 
warning to a more forensically relevant format and participants were told that in a real court case 
they would be instructed to disregard any additional feedback they received and to rely solely on 
their own memory for the event. With these instructions, participants who received the PIF 
reported better witnessing conditions than those who did not receive PIF, the common PIF effect. 
Lampinen et al. interpreted these findings as demonstrating that warnings could work, in theory, 
but do not readily translate to more realistic scenarios. Of interest, and lacking from the 
literature, is the impact of warning witnesses explicitly about what PIF can do to their 
retrospective judgments. In sum, the current literature on PIF has remained consistent over the 
years demonstrating it to be a robust and harmful phenomenon when considering eyewitness 
credibility. 
Theoretical mechanisms 
The theoretical mechanisms underlying PIF have been of interest to psycholegal 
researchers trying to better understand the phenomenon. The nature of PIF is interesting because 
the feedback occurs after an identification is provided. Therefore, PIF statements do not impact 
witness accuracy, but rather their assessments of their identification process. In their original 
study, Wells and Bradfield (1998) proposed that the PIF effect occurred because, when witnesses 
observe a crime, they do not form online memory traces for the specific retrospective judgments 
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that will be evaluated later (e.g., the goodness of their view, their level of attention, etc.). So, 
lacking this information, when witnesses receive PIF suggesting that they were correct, the 
feedback is used as a suggestive cue permitting the witness to make inferences and provide a 
response to the retrospective judgments. Specifically, a witness who is told that they identified 
the correct person may reason “I identified the right person, therefore, I must have had a good 
view.”  
Others have argued for a slight variation of this idea. Rather than claim that witnesses do 
not form the memory traces that would allow them to make these judgments, they suggest that 
any relevant traces are inaccessible when they are asked to provide retrospective judgments 
(Neuschatz et al., 2007; Quinlivan, Neuschatz, Douglass, Wells, & Wetmore, 2012; Wells & 
Bradfield, 1999; Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). This notion became known as the cue-accessibility 
framework. The cue-accessibility framework has been likened to Bem’s (1972) self-perception 
theory of beliefs and attitudes: When internal cues (i.e., memory for the culprit) are weak, people 
will draw conclusions about their beliefs and attitudes based on their behavior and contextual 
information. The cue accessibility account is also supported by evidence confirming the notion 
that accurate witnesses are less severely impacted by PIF than are inaccurate witnesses 
(Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002; Steblay, Wells, Douglass, 2014). This is because the cue 
accessibility theory would predict accurate witnesses are less likely to need to rely on external 
factors, such as feedback, because they have strong internal cues and would therefore not be as 
strongly influenced.   
While these accounts propose two different states (i.e., not formed at all or formed, but 
inaccessible) pertaining to whether these assessments are formed, they posit a similar 
explanation regarding how PIF impacts judgments. Specifically, they suggest that witnesses 
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utilize feedback as a cue because they lack the information to provide a judgment, either due to 
never having formed this information or by being unable to access it. An alternative account of 
the PIF effect is known as the self-presentation interpretation (SPI; Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). 
According to SPI, once the witness obtains the confirming feedback, they feel good that they 
made the “correct” choice and proceed to try to appear like a good witness. To that end, they will 
try to present themselves as having been certain all along, paid excellent attention, etc. However, 
the SPI has not been well supported within the literature (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). For 
example, studies that have participants provide their retrospective judgments before receiving 
feedback reduced the negative impact of PIF (Wells & Bradfield, 1999). Specifically, forcing 
witnesses to create trace information pertaining to those retrospective judgments prior to the 
feedback prevented the witnesses from having to rely on the feedback to provide their responses. 
This finding was used to argue against the SPI on the basis that having formed these initial 
judgments before the feedback should not reduce the effects of PIF if participants were merely 
trying to present themselves positively. Specifically, because the judgments made prior to the 
feedback are private to the witness and not reported to the experimenter, they would still be able 
to present themselves as confident, attentive, etc. These findings are in contrast to what would be 
expected from the SPI explanation of PIF, while they support the cue-accessibility account. 
The cue-accessibility account was later further expanded upon by Charman, Carlucci, 
Vallano, and Gregory (2010). In this updated version, termed the Selective Cue Integration 
Framework (SCIF), the explanation behind the PIF effect was expanded to be a three-stage 
process pertaining to how witnesses provide retrospective judgments (see Figure 1). The SCIF 
proposes that when witnesses are asked questions regarding their retrospective judgments, they 
first elaborate any internal cues that are available to them (e.g., strong memory for the event). 
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This is referred to as the assessment stage. Should there be no strong internal cues on which to 
rely, witnesses proceed to the second stage, known as the search stage. In this stage, witnesses 
will look for and attempt to incorporate any external cues (e.g., feedback from an administrator). 
If this search yields external cues, the witness will then assess how reliable or credible these 
external cues might be (evaluation stage). If the cues are perceived to be reliable, then the 
external cue is used to provide the retrospective judgments. This account is better prepared to 
explain some of the findings pertaining to how feedback can be negated through suspicion 
(Neuschatz et al., 2007) or through warnings (Lampinen et al., 2007; Exp. 1 & 2). The SCIF is 
typically viewed as an extension of the cue accessibility account.  
The SCIF could be likened to the cue-utilization view of metacognition (Koriat, 1997). 
This view incorporates two important components: cue validity and cue utilization. The former is 
the notion that there are certain features that are diagnostic indicators of accuracy in memory 
performance (e.g., answers that come to mind more quickly are more likely to be accurate, 
Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). The latter pertains to the heuristics that individuals may 
rely on to decide whether to incorporate the cue validity into retrospective judgments like 
confidence (e.g., response times are incorporated into the subjective confidence ratings regarding 
how accurate individuals believe that they are; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat, 2008). This 
approach suggests that there is an inferential approach to metacognitive judgments like feeling of 
knowing (FOK), judgments of learning (JOLs), and subjective confidence (Koriat, 1997). 
Specifically, when participants make these judgments, they are not necessarily relying only on 
memory strength, but may also be relying on additional cues to produce these judgments, such as 
how difficult the items were to study (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969), the type of test that will be 
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used (Mazzoni & Cornoldi, 1993), or beliefs about their own memory performance (Hertzog, 
Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990).  
The similarities between the SCIF and the cue utilization approach are that both accounts 
suggest that individuals have information that could be diagnostic indicators of memory 
(assessment stage and cue validity respectively) and that individuals make decisions regarding 
whether those cues will be used (evaluation stage and cue utilization). There are some contrasts 
between these two approaches. First, the SCIF appears to rely more on the notion that the 
memory (strong or weak) witnesses have are the internal cues whereas the cue utilization 
approach includes a broader array of information such as fluency or response times. The SCIF 
also treats the search and evaluation stages as two separate processes with differential predictions 
about what sort of information is likely to be used in each stage. The SCIF also appears to 
incorporate a flavor of confirmation bias, where it makes predictions that disconfirming pieces of 
information are more likely to be ignored during earlier stages (i.e., assessment and search 
stages) and incorporated in the last stage of evaluation. Alternatively, the cue accessibility 
approach appears to focus more on whether the cue is incorporated at all. 
The SCIF can also be compared to Whittlesea’s (1997) Selective Construction And 
Preservation of Experiences (SCAPE) framework (Whittlesea & Leboe, 2000). This account 
suggests that accessing memories involve two distinct stages: production and evaluation. 
Production refers to production of mental states, where images or ideas are brought to mind. This 
is done when some sort of perceptual input is presented (e.g., a retrieval cue), which then 
produces information. For example, seeing a face might result in producing the name (Goldinger 
& Hansen, 2005; Neisser, 1967). Evaluation is the process by which people monitor their 
production functions based on their subjective states of mind. For example, it is easy to 
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recognize a colleague who is encountered daily. Seeing that colleague in the hall will result in 
automatic recognition and the evaluation process will not be aroused. Alternatively, if the 
colleague has recently had a haircut that differs from their normal style, the production process 
will immediately recognize your colleague, but the evaluation process will acknowledge the 
dysfluency that something is different. This triggering of the evaluation process then results in a 
search to identify the discrepancy. Within SCAPE, the discordant feelings are a result of what 
Whittlesea et al. termed the discrepancy-attribution process (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001). 
Specifically, people have expectations regarding how perceptual inputs should be processed, and 
when those assumptions are violated (e.g., “something about my colleague looks different”), the 
individual tries to identify the discrepancy (e.g., the haircut).  
This framework posits that the production and evaluation stages are two automatic 
processes that occur when individuals encounter perceptual stimuli. Specifically, these processes 
both contribute to memory for items. This account differs from what is proposed by the SCIF 
framework by suggesting that the subjective states (i.e., confidence) is actually a component of 
the memory trace (or the internal cue). Where SCIF indicates that confidence in an identification 
is made by making inferences about the witness’s memory and any external cues, SCAPE posits 
that this could be information that the witness already possesses as part of their internal cue. 
Additionally, the SCAPE framework posits that both the production and evaluation stage are 
automatic whereas the search and evaluation stages in the SCIF are described as being a more 




Figure 1. The Selective Cue Integration Framework. Taken from Charman, Carlucci, Vallano, 
and Hyman (2010). 
 
Charman et al. (2010) argued that there are testable theoretical claims and examined 
factors that impact the stages differentially. Specifically, the SCIF argues that confidence can be 
inflated, but not deflated, in the search stage, whereas the opposite should occur in the evaluation 
stage. The basis for these assumptions stem from the attitude change literature where research 
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has shown that people are biased to initially search for evidence that supports instead of 
challenges their preexisting beliefs (i.e., the confirmation bias; Nickerson, 1988) and that people 
are more likely to initially scrutinize disconfirming information to exclude it (Anderson, Lepper, 
& Ross; 1980; Edwards & Smith, 1996; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Alternatively, in the 
evaluation stage, any additional confirming evidence should not heavily impact confidence 
because these confirming cues would have already been incorporated at the search stage.  
Charman et al. tested this notion in a series of three studies. In Experiment 1a and b, 
Charman et al. argued the data supported these claims because having disconfirming feedback 
presented alone did not reduce participants’ confidence in their identification decision but did 
reduce confidence when the confirming feedback was recanted at a later time (the experimenter 
originally provided confirming feedback but then returned a minute later and said “Actually I 
made a mistake. You identified the wrong person. The suspect was someone else”). Their 
interpretation was that, when the disconfirming feedback was presented immediately after 
witnesses made their identification, they were still in the search stage, and the feedback was 
discounted. However, when it was presented later (via a recantation of the confirming feedback 
after a minute delay), that this was during participants’ evaluation stage and, thus, was taken into 
account, which resulted in witnesses no longer feeling as confident in their identification. These 
findings demonstrate that information is used differently depending on what stage of the SCIF 
participants were in. Experiment 2 tested the predictive ability of the SCIF using a cowitness 
paradigm. Participants heard cowitnesses either identify the same or a different lineup member 
with either high or low confidence. In line with what would be predicted by the SCIF, hearing a 
cowitness identify the same suspect resulted in higher confidence (confirming information at the 
search stage) whereas hearing a cowitness identify someone else did not impact participants’ 
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confidence (disconfirming information at the search stage). However, when the cowitness 
identified the same suspect, if they did so with low levels of confidence, the confidence inflation 
was eliminated (disconfirming information at the evaluation stage) whereas high confidence, 
same suspect identifications did not further inflate confidence (confirming information at the 
evaluation stage). In Experiment 2, the confidence level manipulation served as a way for 
participants to assess the credibility of the cowitness’s identification, which occurs in the 
evaluation stage. The authors concluded that SCIF was a viable theoretical framework when 
examining PIF. 
Jurors and PIF 
The extant literature on PIF illustrates a phenomenon that appears to be very robust and 
one that is not easily ameliorated. However, perhaps trying to address the harmful nature of PIF 
at the witness level is not the most efficient way to solve this problem. Rather, it is possible that 
jurors may be able to recognize these suggestive statements and, when such a statement is 
present, incorporate that into their assessment of the eyewitness. Unfortunately, research has 
shown that judges, jurors, and lawyers are largely unaware of factors that can impair eyewitness 
identifications (Lindsay, 1994; Wise & Safer, 2004). Additionally, Kassin and Barndollar (1992) 
revealed that laypeople, who were jury-eligible college students, largely were not privy to factors 
that impact eyewitness accuracy, demonstrating that this information is not necessarily intuitive 
for triers of fact. This is important to note because if potential jurors cannot appreciate the more 
fundamental aspects of what can contribute to an inaccurate identification, it is also likely the 
case that they may not appreciate the more subtle factors that can influence witness testimony. 
The recommendations for obtaining eyewitness evidence already encourage audio or video 
recording of the entire identification procedure in an attempt to maintain evidence integrity 
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(Cory, 2001; Kassin, 1998, Technical Working Group, 1999). Furthermore, there are some police 
forces that are using such approaches when working with eyewitnesses (Beaudry & Lindsay, 
2006; New South Wales Police Force, 2012; North Carolina General Assembly, 2007; Police & 
Criminal Evidence Act, 2011).  
A relatively recent suggestion is that videotaped identifications may be able to aid jurors 
when assessing eyewitness identifications (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014; Wilford & Wells, 
2013). To date, relatively little research has explored how providing this recorded information to 
mock-jurors impacts their evaluations of witnesses and evaluations of guilt. Reardon and Fisher 
(2011) showed that providing video evidence can aid in jury decision-making: The inclusion of a 
video helped participants more accurately discriminate between accurate and inaccurate 
witnesses. Additionally, Douglass and Jones (2013) found that showing participants videotaped, 
as opposed to written, witness evidence allowed participants to recognize when confidence 
varied between the time of identification and the trial. As a result, participants who saw the 
videotaped testimony where the witness was more confident at trial than they were at the original 
identification rated the witness as being less credible, less accurate, and less consistent, while 
also lowering their ratings of defendant guilt relative to when these statements were read. 
Importantly, the witnesses in this study were actors so there were no accurate and inaccurate 
witnesses. Although this suggests that participants in the study are gleaning additional 
information from the video that could be diagnostic of how reliable a witness is, the study 
notably did not include a ‘no additional information’ condition to allow for full comparisons 
between video, written, and a baseline control condition. An equally promising finding observed 
by Modjadidi and Kovera (2018) who found that participants who saw videotaped identifications 
and were warned about the dangers of single blind procedures were more sensitive in 
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recognizing when lineups were conducted in a single blind manner. Furthermore, participants 
were also less likely to convict a defendant under those circumstances. Similar to Douglass & 
Jones (2013) the witnesses were actors so there were no accurate or inaccurate identifications. 
The focus of both the Douglass and Jones as well as the Modjadidi and Kovera studies were to 
assess whether mock jurors could be sensitized to these issues and recognize them when they 
were present in the eyewitness identification videos. 
However, not all studies examining videotaped identifications are so optimistic pertaining 
to jurors. An early study conducted by Kassin, Rigby, and Castillo (1991) examined whether 
viewing an eyewitness’s videotaped identification resulted in more accurate mock-juror 
evaluations than showing the witness’s testimony. Regardless of what type of witness evidence 
participants saw and witnesses’ overall accuracy, participants believed the witness 42% of the 
time, suggesting that discriminating between accurate and inaccurate witnesses is a daunting 
task. Additionally, Beaudry et al. (2015) reported evidence suggesting these video recordings 
may be less promising than previously thought. This study tested multiple factors that pertain to 
eyewitness identifications. This included the type of lineup, identification accuracy, lineup 
administration, and the type of evidence that participants saw (the identification, the witness 
testimony, or both the identification and testimony). Largely, their results showed that, overall, 
participants were more willing than not to believe eyewitness evidence. Their results found that 
participants were least likely to believe the witness when they only viewed their identification in 
isolation (i.e., without their testimony). In contrast to Reardon and Fisher (2011), participants 
were not able to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses. Similarly, participants 
in this study were not able to differentiate between single and double blind procedures as was 
seen in Modjadidi and Kovera (2018), although this could have been because the latter included 
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an expert witness who testified about the perils of single blind studies. Most importantly, with 
regard to the current study, Beaudry et al. found that witnesses who received PIF were more 
likely to be believed than those who did not receive the PIF (a finding also shown in Quinlivan, 
Cash, Jenkins, & Le Grand, in prep). From this, there is evidence that not only can PIF be 
deleterious to a witness’s retrospective judgments, but that this can also tarnish triers of facts’ 
interpretations of witness accuracy. Seemingly, in both Beaudry et al. and Quinlivan et al., the 
inclusion of PIF appears to act as confirmation to the mock-juror that the witness was correct. 
This was highlighted further by Quinlivan, Cash, Jenkins and Le Grand (in prep), who examined 
mock-jurors’ perceptions about how good of a view the witness had, how good of a basis they 
had to make an identification, etc. They found that each evaluative judgment increased when 
they saw the witness receive PIF. Both studies caution the recommendation of showing 
videotaped identification procedures to jurors without more research to further investigate the 
secondary transfer of PIF to mock-jurors. 
Cause for concern?  
Psycholegal researchers would agree that the PIF effect is a well-documented 
phenomenon and there is a substantial amount of evidence regarding how PIF can impact 
witnesses’ retrospective judgments. Unfortunately, this is not true for its impact on jurors. As 
noted earlier, only two studies have explored the impact of PIF on jury decision-making and both 
studied the impact of videotaped procedures. While these provide promising initial insight into 
the effects of PIF on jury decision-making, there is still much that is lacking with regard to how 
these suggestive statements might be interpreted by jurors. For example, it is unknown whether 
the effects of PIF on jurors are only limited to their perceptions of the witness. Could it also be 
possible that the effect of PIF may extend even more broadly than currently thought? 
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Specifically, does the presentation of PIF also lend itself to “PIF by proxy” for jurors who see the 
witness receive these suggestive statements? For example, a juror who sees the witness receive 
confirming feedback may think the witness was paying great attention, had a great basis for their 
identification and then may also believe that they, as a juror, were paying great attention to the 
trial, had a great basis for their verdict decision, etc. In this instance, the legal system may end up 





The goal of the current studies was to further examine the effects of PIF on mock-jurors. 
Although PIF is difficult to eliminate in witnesses, sensitizing jurors to its harmful effects on 
witnesses’ confidence could serve as a way to encourage more accurate verdict decisions. 
However, Beaudry et al. (2015) and Quinlivan et al. (in prep) appear to suggest that jurors 
seemingly view PIF as confirmation that a witness is correct. Are there broader implications that 
this feedback provides to jurors, such as their overall performance as a jury member?  
Across two experiments, I evaluated the effect of PIF on mock-jurors’ perceptions of an 
eyewitness, as well as their perceptions of their own performance as a juror (Exp. 1). I also 
explored whether mock-jurors can recognize PIF and incorporate its potential danger to witness 
testimony when warned about the harmful effects of PIF (Exp. 2). Experiment 1 served as a 
conceptual replication to Beaudry et al. (2015) and Quinlivan et al. (in prep) by testing whether 
there is a transfer of PIF from witnesses to jurors that alters the jurors’ perceptions about the 
witness’s viewing experience. As an extension, participants also provided ratings about their own 
juror experience. These questions were modeled after those that are typically asked about 
eyewitnesses to assess whether the PIF effect expands even more broadly than what is currently 
thought. Experiment 2 explored whether mock-jurors are able to recognize and weight testimony 
that has been tainted by PIF less heavily than if no PIF had been provided. If it is the case that a 
simple warning can eliminate the effects of PIF on witness perceptions, then perhaps any dangers 
of PIF to jurors are not so detrimental. 
I predicted that the PIF effect would not only impact perceptions of the witness, but 
would also extend to mock-jurors perceptions about their own juror experience. Furthermore, I 
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predicted that when jurors were made aware of the dangers of PIF, they would find the witness 




The goal of Experiment 1 was to further researchers’ understanding of the parameters of 
PIF and its impact on jurors. To do this, Experiment 1 served as a conceptual replication and 
extension of both Beaudry et al. (2015) and Quinlivan et al. (in prep). I manipulated the presence 
of PIF in eyewitness identification videos that participants viewed. Participants rated factors 
assessing the witnessing experience of the witness as well as factors that assessed their own 
mock-juror experience.  
Method 
Participants 
To determine the number of participants needed for Experiment 1, a power analysis was 
conducted. Using an alpha of .05, a beta of .8, looking for a medium effect size of D = .5 with an 
independent samples t-test, the required number of participants was 102 with 51 participants per 
condition. Because I had two versions of both the PIF and no PIF videos, I doubled this sample 
size. A total of 200 participants were recruited to participate in Experiment 1 (nPIF1 = 49, nPIF2 = 
51, nNoPIF1 = 50, nNoPIF2 = 50). Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and 
were required to have an approval rating of at least 98% as well as having had completed at least 
1000 HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks) prior to participating in the study. The mean age for 
participants in this study was 35.95 years (SD = 11.18). Of the participants who took part in the 
study, 63% identified as male and 76% identified as Caucasian. The IRB approval for this study 
can be seen in Appendix A. 
Stimuli  
Videos. The stimuli were four eyewitness identification videos. These videos were filmed 
with actors acting as witnesses and law enforcement. There were two videos that contained PIF, 
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while the other two did not. The videos depicted the law enforcement officer reading unbiased 
lineup instructions (i.e., the person may or may not be in the lineup), before the witness selected 
a suspect from the lineup. Please see Appendix B for the scripts for all four videos. The videos 
for the current study can be seen here:  
https://osf.io/fxhv4/?view_only=0879aee1a2934fa5b71a81ad6f6710a9. Witness-actors were 
instructed to pause for five seconds before providing their identification (e.g., “Number 4”) 
without any additional verbal or non-verbal cues. For the PIF videos, the law enforcement officer 
provided confirmatory feedback such as “Great job. That is exactly who we thought it was too.” 
The PIF absent videos ended after the witness made their identification choice and were signing 
their identification sheet. The purpose of having two PIF and two no PIF videos was to serve as a 
replication attempt. The two PIF and no PIF videos conveyed the same information, but with 
minor changes between the two scripts. All videos were between 35-38 seconds in length. In an 
attempt to keep the level of emotion consistent between the PIF and No PIF videos, both actors 
were instructed to speak with a neutral tone throughout the interaction, including when 
delivering and receiving the PIF. Participants in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to view 
only one of the four videos. The videos in the current study were normed by asking a sample of 
79 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to answer three questions about the videos. They were 
asked to rate the quality of the video, the quality of the audio, and they were asked to guess the 
hypothesis of the study (i.e., does the PIF statement impact perceptions of the eyewitness?). 
Participants in the norming study only viewed one of the four videos. The audio and video 
quality questions were rated on a 1-6 Likert scale with 1 representing terrible quality and 6 
representing terrific quality. The average ratings for all videos on these two questions were 4.03 
(SD = 1.25) and 4.70 (SD = 1.02) respectively. More importantly, none of the participants were 
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able to guess the goal of the experiment, suggesting that the PIF statements were not obvious 
enough to produce demand characteristics. 
Retrospective judgments. Participants provided two sets of retrospective judgment ratings 
per video. The first set were judgments about the witness and the second set were judgments 
about participants’ own juror experience. The judgments regarding the witness were an adapted 
version of those used in Quinlivan, Cash, Jenkins, and Le Grand (in prep). Similar to Quinlivan 
et al. these judgments were provided on 11-point Likert scales. Additionally, these judgments 
were then adapted to form parallel versions in which participants could assess perceptions about 
their performance as a mock-juror. These questions can be seen in Appendix C. 
Design  
Experiment 1 was a single factor, between subjects design that manipulated the presence 
of PIF (present, not present). The primary factors of interest were participants’ perceptions of the 
witness as well as their perceptions about their own juror experience.  
Procedure  
The survey was conducted on Qualtrics and distributed through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Participants began the study by first providing consent. After consent was obtained, they 
were instructed that they would act as a juror who is being asked to consider the testimony from 
an eyewitness. They were told to pay attention because they would be asked questions about the 
witness. After indicating that they understand the instructions, participants were then randomly 
shown one of the four witness videos. After viewing the witness video, participants were asked 
to provide the retrospective judgments for both themselves and the witnesses. These questions 
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can be seen in Appendix C. At this point, participants provided demographic information, before 
being thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to assess whether the presence of PIF not only impacts 
perceptions about the witness, but also whether it impacts perceptions on mock-jurors’ 
experiences. I conducted two sets of overall analyses: the perceptions of the witness and 
perceptions of the juror. It is important to note that both the perceptions of the witness and 
perceptions of the juror pertain to multiple judgments as seen in Appendix A. However, the 
prediction is that PIF (or lack of) will influence these judgments similarly. To correct for 
multiple comparisons, the alpha for all univariate analyses was adjusted using a Bonferroni 
correction and is set at .0028. A multivariate analysis was conducted to look for outliers in the 
data set. The analysis revealed 10 participants who differed significantly from the overall pattern 
of data, however, their inclusion did not impact the pattern of the results so their data are 
included in the following analyses. Before conducting any of the primary analyses, I tested to see 
if there were any differences between the two PIF videos as well as the two No PIF videos. 
There were no significant differences between these two sets of videos on the dependent 
variables of interest so I have collapsed across the versions 1 and 2 for the PIF and No PIF 
videos. The result of this is that the comparisons will now be between the PIF and No PIF 
videos. 
Does PIF impact perceptions about the witness? 
To examine whether the presence of PIF impacted jurors’ perceptions of an eyewitness, I 
conducted independent samples t-tests for each of the nine factors participants provided ratings 
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for. With the alpha corrections for multiple comparisons, none of the analyses were significant 
(all ps > .03). Specifically, the presence or absence of PIF did not alter participants’ ratings 
between the two conditions. The means, t, and p values can be seen in Table 3. To investigate 
whether these data represent true null results, I repeated the frequentist analyses using Bayesian 
t-tests, which provide evidence in favor of the alternative (BF10) or null (BF01) hypotheses 
(these values can be seen in Table 3 and Figure 2). These values were calculated using JASP 
(JASP Team, 2018). The Bayes Factor that is produced can be interpreted as an odds ratio, 
expressing whether one hypothesis (either the null or alternative) is more likely than the other. 
When interpreting the strength of evidence from these values, Jeffreys (1961) suggests that odds 
smaller than 3:1 should be viewed as anecdotal evidence, odds that fall between 3:1 and 10:1 
should be viewed as strong evidence, and odds that are greater than 10:1 should be seen as 
substantial evidence. I have also included odds ratio markers for 2:1, 3:1, and 7:1 odds. These 
numbers are arbitrary, but serve to help interpret the data. As can be seen in the figure, most of 
the Bayes factor values appear to provide at least anecdotal (i.e., willingness to testify and how 
much should the witness be trusted) or substantial evidence (i.e., certainty, basis, ease, details, 
duration, and distance) for the null hypothesis. The single exception to this trend is that attention 




Table 3. The means, standard deviations, t values, p values and Bayes factor values for all 
dependent variables and comparisons pertaining to judgments about the witness. 
 
 PIF Presence    
Factor PIF No PIF t p BF10 
Certainty 7.30 (2.32) 7.48 (2.20) -0.56 0.57 0.18 
Testify 9.02 (1.91) 8.55 (2.41) 1.53 0.13 0.46 
Basis 7.19 (2.14) 7.39 (2.18) -0.65 0.51 0.19 
Ease 7.31 (2.49) 7.03 (2.40) 0.81 0.42 0.21 
Trust 6.96 (2.53) 7.54 (2.35) -1.68 0.10 0.57 
Attention 7.72 (2.29) 8.32 (1.73) -2.09 0.04 1.17 
Details 6.90 (2.50) 7.15 (2.28) -0.74 0.46 0.20 
Duration 5.59 (2.28) 5.90 (2.25) -0.97 0.34 0.24 





Figure 2. The Bayes factors for all dependent variables. Dark and light bars are indicative of 
values for the witness and participant respectively. Additionally, the three cutoff lines for 2:1, 
3:1, 7:1 odds are also shown. 
Does PIF impact perceptions about the jurors’ experience?  
To test whether PIF may be even more influential than encompassed by previous studies, 
I conducted independent samples t-tests on participants’ ratings of their juror experience as a 
function of the presence of PIF. Similar to the ratings of the witness, there were no significant 
39 
differences on any of the dependent variables as a function of the presence or absence of PIF (all 
ps > .05). The means, t, and p values can be seen in Table 4. I also conducted Bayes factor values 
for each factor similar to perceptions of the witness, the Bayes factor values provide either 
anecdotal (i.e., certainty, basis, and distance) or substantial evidence (i.e., testify, ease, trust, 
attention, details, and duration) for the null hypothesis. These values can be seen in Figure 2. 
Table 4. The means, standard deviations, t values, p values and Bayes factor values for all 
dependent variables and comparisons pertaining to judgments about the participants’ own 
performance. 
 
 PIF Presence    
Factor PIF No PIF t p BF10 
Certainty 7.09 (2.97) 7.85 (2.57) -1.94 0.05 0.88 
Testify 7.81 (2.95) 7.79 (2.96) 0.05 0.96 0.15 
Basis 6.45 (2.79) 7.00 (2.84) -1.38 0.17 0.38 
Ease 7.25 (2.71) 7.65 (2.67) -1.05 0.30 0.26 





(1.25) -0.63 0.53 0.19 
Details 9.07 (1.81) 9.19 (1.65) -0.49 0.63 0.17 
Duration 3.29 (1.91) 3.38 (2.07) -0.32 0.75 0.16 
Distance 8.72 (1.82) 8.31 (1.95) 1.54 0.13 0.46 
 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 failed to support the proposed hypotheses that predicted a 
PIF effect on both jurors’ perceptions of the witness as well as of their own performance. These 
data differ from Beaudry et al. (2015) and Quinlivan et al. (in prep) who observed participants’ 
viewing the PIF as confirmatory evidence that the witness was correct in their identification. In 
fact, the only analysis that achieved traditional significance was that of participants’ assessments 
of how much attention the witness had paid and this was seen in the opposite direction as what 
would be predicted by the PIF literature (Quinlivan et al., in prep; Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 
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2014). Specifically, participants in the no PIF condition rated the witness as having paid more 
attention than participants in the PIF condition. 
 Despite not finding the traditional PIF effect, the Bayes factor analyses provide helpful 
insight into interpreting the null findings. Specifically, many of the analyses revealed substantial 
support for the null hypothesis. Furthermore, this null effect is somewhat impressive as it is 
fairly consistent across the multitude of dependent variables and consistent across versions 1 and 
2 of the PIF and no PIF videos; demonstrating that these findings are replicable within the study. 
The benefit to knowing whether these findings are truly indicative of a lack of effect is that it 
suggests there may not be a negative effect of showing jurors recorded eyewitness procedures as 
there does not appear to be a difference in perceptions of the witness as a function of the 




The goal of Experiment 1 was to enhance understanding of the impact of PIF, both for 
perceptions of witnesses as well as jurors’ metacognitive assessments of their own performance. 
Although I failed to find the typical PIF effect, it is still possible to assess whether warning jurors 
about the suggestive nature of PIF impacts perceptions of an eyewitness. To this end, Experiment 
2 furthered this examination by exploring whether warning jurors about PIF can negate its effect 
on witnesses.  
To date, no study has attempted to warn jurors about the harmful effect of PIF and only 
one study has attempted to do so for witnesses. Lampinen et al. (2007) found mixed results with 
their attempt to warn participants that they should not incorporate feedback. In Experiments 1 
and 2, this warning was presented in the format of faulty feedback, wherein participants were 
told that any feedback received was randomly generated and, therefore, could not be trusted. 
Under these circumstances, the researchers were able to eliminate the PIF effect. However, their 
more applied approach was not so promising. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants were told that, 
were this a true trial, they would be asked to discount any additional feedback and to discard 
their previously heard feedback. In these studies, participants still appeared to incorporate the 
PIF, because their judgments about their witnessing experience were significantly higher when 
the PIF was present than when it was not. A potential argument to these findings could be that 
the nature of the warning did not compel witnesses to discount that feedback. In other words, 
although the witness was told to ignore the information, there was no reason to suspect that the 
feedback was inaccurate, so they may have ignored this warning. Evidence supporting this 
assumption is seen in Neuschatz et al. (2007) where suspicion regarding the experimenter’s 
motives eliminated the PIF effect. 
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Potentially, a more compelling forensic warning that suggests these statements may make 
witnesses appear more credible than they truly are might eliminate the PIF effect. One way that 
is commonly used in court cases to provide information to members of the jury is to enlist an 
expert witness. Research has shown that jurors have difficulty understanding scientific evidence 
(Thompson & Schumann, 1987) and that having an expert witness for eyewitness evidence 
makes both real and mock-jurors more sensitive to issues regarding eyewitness testimony 
(Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989; Hosch, Beck, & McIntyre, 1980; Loftus, 1980). It is possible 
that having a manipulation that provides similar information to an expert witness may result in 
jurors being more wary of the witnesses who receive the PIF. To this end, the goal of Experiment 




To determine the number of participants needed for Experiment 2, a power analysis was 
conducted. Using an alpha of .05, a beta of .8, looking for a medium effect size of D = .5 with a 
between factors ANOVA, the required number of participants was 104. I elected to nearly double 
this again to account for using the two PIF and no PIF videos. A total of 200 participants were 
recruited to participate in Experiment 2 and randomly assigned to one of the eight video x 
warning conditions. For the warning conditions the means were nPIF1 = 25, nPIF2 = 25, nNoPIF1 = 
25, nNoPIF2 = 26.  For the no warning conditions the means were nPIF1 = 24, nPIF2 = 24, nNoPIF1 = 
26, nNoPIF2 = 25.  Participants were again recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were 
required to have the same qualification criteria as Experiment 1 to participate (i.e., have an 
approval rating of at least 98% and having at least 1000 HITs completed). Participants who had 
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completed Experiment 1 were ineligible to participate in Experiment 2. The mean age for 
participants in this study was 39.06 years (SD = 12.50). Of the participants who took part in the 
study, 57.5% identified as male and 69.5% identified as being Caucasian. 
Stimuli  
Videos. The stimuli for the Experiment 2 were the same four videos that were used in 
Experiment 1. 
Warning. The warning participants received was presented to only participants in the 
warning condition after they viewed the video and prior to making their retrospective judgments. 
The warning can be seen in Appendix D. 
Retrospective judgments. The retrospective judgments that participants were asked were 
the same as those used in Experiment 1. 
Design 
Experiment 2 conformed to a 2 (PIF: present, not present) x 2 (Warning: present, not 
present) between subjects design. The primary factors of interest were participants’ perceptions 
of the witness and their perceptions about their own juror experience. 
Procedure 
The study was similar to Experiment 1. The survey was conducted on Qualtrics and 
distributed through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants provided informed consent and 
received the same instructions as participants in Experiment 1. Participants were randomly 
assigned at the start of the survey to either the warning present or warning absent condition. 
Additionally, they were also assigned to view one of the four videos. Participants then viewed 
their respective eyewitness video. Following this, participants in the warning condition read the 
warning statement while participants in the warning absent condition simply continued on to the 
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next stage in the study. All participants provided their retrospective judgments for the video and 
then completed the demographic information before being debriefed. 
Results 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine whether including a forensically relevant 
warning made mock-jurors more aware of PIF and how it might impact an eyewitness. Similar to 
Experiment 1, I focused on participants’ assessments of the witness and assessments of 
themselves. Although there were no differences in Experiment 1 as a result of PIF, it is possible 
that warning participants about its deleterious effect on eyewitnesses may make participants 
more skeptical of eyewitnesses who received the PIF statement. I conducted a multivariate 
analysis to look for outliers in the data and the analysis revealed there were 7 participants who 
differed significantly from the group. However, similar to Experiment 1, the inclusion of these 
participants did not alter the overall pattern of the data so all participants are included in the 
analyses. I again tested for differences between the sets of videos (i.e., PIF 1 and 2 without a 
warning, PIF 1 and 2 with a warning, No PIF 1 and 2 without a warning, and No PIF 1 and 2 
with a warning). There were no significant differences between the sets of videos so I collapsed 
the data across the two versions of videos for each of the 2 (PIF: present, absent) x 2 (Warning: 
present, absent) videos. Similar to Experiment 1, the alpha level for the univariate analyses was 
set at .0028 to correct for multiple comparisons. 
Does warning mock-jurors about PIF impact ratings of the witness?  
To examine whether warning participants about the harmful effect of PIF on eyewitness 
testimony, I conducted 2 (PIF: present, absent) x 2 (Warning: present, absent) between subjects 
ANOVA for each of the judgments pertaining to the eyewitness. Of these analyses, the only 
comparison to achieve statistical significance was the main effect of warning on participants’ 
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ratings of how long they believed the crime event lasted for the witness (duration), F(1,196) = 
9.40, p = .002, n2p= .046. Specifically, participants who did not receive the warning rated the 
encounter as having lasted longer (M =6.82, SE = .23) than participants who did receive the 
warning (M =5.30, SE = .23). All other comparisons were not significant. Please see Table 5 for 
means and Table 6 for p and Bayes factor values. The Bayes factor values supported the notion 
that the main effect of warning on duration provides strong evidence for the alternate hypothesis 
while also providing moderate evidence for the alternate hypothesis for the main effect of 
warning on details remembered about the face.  
 With regard to evidence for the null, when looking at the main effect of PIF, there was 
substantial evidence for the basis, ease, trust, attention, details and duration variables. All other 
variables provided moderate support for the null. For the main effect of warning, of the 
remaining variables (excluding details and duration), there was substantial evidence for the ease, 
trust, and distance variables while all other factors provided anecdotal evidence. Finally, for the 
interaction, there was anecdotal evidence for the null in the testify and details variables. All other 
remaining variables provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. The Bayes factor 
values for the interaction of all dependent variables are shown in Figure 3.
46  
Table 5. The means and standard deviations for all dependent variables about the witness. 
 PIF, Warning PIF, No Warning No PIF, Warning No PIF, No Warning 
Factor M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Certainty 7.38 2.10 7.73 2.75 6.47 2.63 7.37 2.21 
Testify 9.14 1.48 9.17 2.09 8.33 1.79 9.14 1.80 
Basis 7.48 1.79 7.75 2.55 7.02 1.97 7.76 2.09 
Ease 7.04 1.99 7.40 2.46 6.80 2.11 7.10 2.01 
Trust 7.30 1.96 7.46 2.70 6.96 2.30 7.57 2.01 
Attention 7.76 1.97 8.19 2.49 7.43 2.23 7.96 2.10 
Details 7.08 1.82 7.27 2.54 6.63 2.17 7.71 1.91 
Duration 5.46 2.10 6.27 2.62 5.14 2.17 6.29 2.17 
Distance 6.72 1.43 7.13 2.25 6.37 1.50 6.51 1.82 
 
Table 6. The p values and Bayes factor values for all comparisons made pertaining to judgments about the witness. *denotes statistical 
significance for p values. 
 
 Certainty Testify Basis Ease Trust Attention Details Duration Distance 
PIF (p) 0.07 0.10 0.46 0.38 0.72 0.37 0.98 0.64 0.06 
Warning (p) 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.13 0.04 0.00* 0.28 
PIF*Warning (p) 0.42 0.13 0.43 0.92 0.48 0.87 0.14 0.59 0.59 
PIF (BF) 0.72 0.54 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.84 
Warning (BF) 0.70 0.54 0.60 0.26 0.31 0.46 1.30 12.32 0.26 
PIF*Warning (BF) 0.28 0.60 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.51 0.25 0.23 
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Figure 3. The Bayes factors for the interaction for all dependent variables. Dark and light bars 
are indicative of values for the witness and participant respectively. Additionally, the three cutoff 
lines for 2:1, 3:1, and 7:1 odds are also shown.
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Does warning mock-jurors about PIF impact their perceptions of their own performance?  
To test whether there is an effect of warning on participants’ perceptions of their own 
performance, I conducted 2 (PIF: present, absent) x 2 (Warning: present, absent) between 
subjects ANOVA for each of the mock-juror judgments. None of the conducted analyses reached 
significance. See Table 7 for means and Table 8 for p and Bayes factor values. With regard to the 
Bayes factor values, only the main effect of PIF on certainty produced anecdotal evidence for the 
alternate hypotheses. All other values provided evidence toward the null. 
The Bayes factor values for the main effect of PIF revealed anecdotal evidence for the 
null in the testify, ease, and detail variables while providing substantial evidence for the basis, 
trust, attention, and distance variables. For the main effect of warning, there was anecdotal 
evidence for the null in the testify variable, substantial evidence for the certainty, ease, trust, 
attention, details, duration, and distance variables, and strong evidence for the basis variable. 
Finally, with regard to the interaction, there was anecdotal evidence for the null in the testify, 
and duration variables. All other variables provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. 
The Bayes factor values for the interaction of all dependent variables are presented in Figure 3.
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Table 7. The means and standard deviations for all dependent variables pertaining to the mock-jurors. 
 PIF, Warning PIF, No Warning No PIF, Warning No PIF, No Warning 
Factor M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Certainty 7.58 2.38 8.13 2.63 6.88 2.96 7.22 2.67 
Testify 7.80 2.48 7.98 2.88 6.88 3.12 7.86 2.64 
Basis 7.16 2.43 6.92 3.19 6.12 2.88 6.75 2.78 
Ease 7.52 2.43 7.79 2.49 6.88 2.97 7.25 2.83 
Trust 7.26 2.62 7.40 2.90 7.04 3.02 7.41 2.71 
Attention 10.34 1.29 10.63 0.98 10.63 0.96 10.29 1.19 
Details 9.40 1.44 9.60 1.61 9.10 1.78 9.22 1.86 
Duration 3.56 1.70 3.33 2.45 3.25 1.64 3.94 2.28 
Distance 8.42 2.05 8.83 1.88 8.29 2.04 8.51 2.13 
 
Table 8. The p values and Bayes factor values for all comparisons made pertaining to judgments about the mock-jurors.  
 Certainty Testify     Basis      Ease     Trust Attention Details Duration Distance 
PIF (p) 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.80 0.89 0.15 0.60 0.44 
Warning (p) 0.25 0.14 0.63 0.40 0.53 0.88 0.50 0.43 0.28 
PIF*Warning 
(p) 0.78 0.31 0.28 0.90 0.77 0.05 0.86 0.12 0.73 
PIF (BF) 1.23 0.34 0.17 0.47 0.16 0.16 0.41 0.17 0.20 
Warning (BF) 0.28 0.42 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.27 
PIF*Warning 
(BF) 0.21 0.34 1.00 0.21 0.21 1.17 0.20 0.62 0.22 
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Does warning mock-jurors make them more likely to recognize PIF?  
 Although not one of my planned research questions, an interesting question is whether 
participants who had been warned about PIF were more likely to recognize the suggestive 
statement when the statement was in fact presented. To examine this question, I conducted a 
binary logistic regression looking only at participants who received the PIF with warning being 
the only independent variable. For the purpose of this analysis, participants who did not hear the 
PIF statement were excluded. Although an examination of the nominal data might suggest there 
would be a statistically significant difference, this analysis revealed that there was no difference 
in the rates of which participants in either the warning or no warning condition reported 
recognizing the PIF statement, b = .786, Wald χ 2 (1) = 2.86, p = .09. The lack of significant 
difference between the two warning groups is most likely a result of a ceiling effect in both 
conditions where participants generally were likely to report having heard the officer say 
something that would impact the witness’s perceptions of their performance. Of the 50 
participants in the warning condition, 40 of those reported having heard a suggestive statement 
(80%). Similarly, of the 48 participants in the no warning condition, 31 also reported having 
heard a suggestive statement (65%).  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 produced a very similar pattern to Experiment 1 in that I was not able to 
replicate the traditional PIF effect. These findings do replicate Experiment 1, however, in that the 
effect of PIF may only be limited to impacting witnesses’ perceptions about their accuracy and 
potentially do not extend to jurors who are asked to evaluate the witness identification. The 
Bayes Factor analyses again provide evidence that this may be a true null effect of the presence 
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of PIF, suggesting that there may not necessarily be a detriment to showing jurors eyewitness 
videos. 
 Interestingly, the presence or absence of a warning did not appear to impact participants’ 
perceptions of the eyewitness, even when the witness received PIF. Given that ratings of the 
witness were not impacted, this seems to provide support to the notion suggested by Lampinen et 




 The goal of the current investigation was to evaluate the impact of PIF on mock-jurors. 
The aim of the studies were three-fold: 1) to replicate prior literature that found PIF also impacts 
mock-jurors, 2) to test whether the PIF extends beyond perceptions of the witness to also impact 
perceptions of mock-jurors’ own performance, and 3) to reveal whether warning participants 
about PIF influences perceptions of the witness and mock-juror. In contrast to what was 
observed in Beaudry et al. (2015) and Quinlivan et al. (in prep), the current studies failed to 
detect an impact of the suggestive PIF on participants’ perceptions of the witness. Furthermore, I 
did not observe any effect of PIF on participants’ perceptions of their own performance. 
Although the PIF effect was not observed in Experiment 1, warning participants about its 
harmful effect on an eyewitness’s retrospective judgments could have still produced differential 
ratings where participants in the PIF with warning condition perceived the witness as being less 
credible as indexed by the relevant PIF questions. However, this pattern of data was not 
observed. Similar to Experiment 1, there were no significant differences as a function of PIF 
presence. The only significant evidence for the alternative hypothesis was that participants who 
had been provided a warning rated the encounter as having lasted for a shorter duration than 
those who had not received a warning: a finding that does not lend itself to providing insight on 
how PIF might impact jurors who view an eyewitness identification procedure at trial. However, 
the Bayes Factor values provide important insight into the PIF effect as well. Specifically, that 
there was either substantial or strong evidence for the null hypothesis, which suggests that 
perhaps the secondary transfer of PIF is not as prevalent of a problem as previous research might 
suggest. 
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Taken in isolation and at face value, these data seem to suggest that showing real jurors a 
videotaped identification procedure that contains these suggestive statements will not produce 
any differences in perceptions made about the witness. Additionally, given that the PIF relevant 
questions assess judgments that indicate how credible the witness may appear to jurors, these 
data suggest that there is no difference regarding how credible a witness appears to be as a 
function of the PIF statement. Despite the dangers that PIF can have on eyewitnesses (Steblay, 
Wells, & Douglass, 2014), these findings are optimistic in that showing eyewitnesses’ 
identification procedure recordings will not bias jurors if PIF is present. It is still important to 
note the effect of PIF on the witness testimony as witnesses who have received the PIF will still 
be overconfident in their identification at the time of trial, however, previous research has shown 
that jurors are able to recognize these discrepancies in confidence (Douglass & Jones, 2013). 
Furthermore, the fact that the current studies did not detect differences in perceptions of the 
witness as a function of PIF presence posits that perhaps showing jurors eyewitness 
identification videos could be beneficial.  
Science is never interpreted in isolation, and the data from the current studies are in direct 
contrast to data from Beaudry et al. (2015) and Quinlivan et al. (in prep). This raises questions 
about why the current study failed to replicate these results. Additionally, these data pose a 
secondary (and more forensically relevant) question regarding whether mock-jurors also view 
PIF as confirmation that the witness was accurate. One potential reason for the discrepancy 
between the current study and prior literature may lie in the materials that were used. 
Specifically, the difference may stem from the videotaped eyewitness procedure. The actors in 
the current study were instructed to remain devoid of emotion when providing and receiving the 
PIF statement. This was done to try keep the PIF and no PIF videos as consistent as possible by 
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specifically trying to avoid an extra factor of emotion compounded with the PIF statement and 
this was a contrast to the videos used by Quinlivan et al. (in prep). This may be why our results 
failed to replicate the prior research.  
The lack of emotion in the videos may have affected the current study’s ability to find the 
secondary PIF effect through one of two ways. First, it might be the case that the emotional 
component of the PIF statement may make the statement more believable and seem to be a 
reliable cue when assessing the eyewitness. One of the functions of emotion in language is to 
provide emphasis to important points (Hamilton, Hunter, & Burgoon, 1990). Emotion has been 
shown to lend itself to overall believability. For example, Vrij and Fischer (1997) suggested that 
credibility is enhanced when emotional responses fit with the expected emotional reaction within 
a situation (e.g., despair after a traumatic event). In the case of the current study, maybe the lack 
of an emotion component when delivering and receiving the PIF statement made this less 
believable and therefore, less likely to be used as a cue when assessing the perceptions of the 
eyewitness. This suggestion could be in line if the SCIF model (Charman et al., 2010) is seen to 
extend from eyewitnesses to mock-jurors. Specifically, the second stage of the model is the 
search phase, where individuals look for external cues (e.g., the PIF) that could confirm the 
witness’s identification. However, this evidence is then assessed in the evaluation stage, where 
potentially the lack of believability undermined the credibility of the PIF cue, which caused 
participants to disregard the PIF when making their assessments. Adding additional video 
conditions that use the same script as the ones used in the current study, but have the actors 
incorporate the more natural emotion and emphasis for both the PIF and no PIF videos could 
assess this explanation. 
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A second and alternate explanation may be more in line with demand characteristics. 
Demand characteristics occur when participants create an interpretation regarding the goals of a 
research study and unconsciously alter their behavior accordingly (Orne, 1996; 2009). With 
regard to the PIF literature, demand characteristics would be observed in that the PIF statements 
may stand out enough that participants in prior studies were able to guess the purpose of the 
study, and provided higher ratings to witnesses who received the suggestive PIF statements. 
Although the prior studies were between subjects, this remains an alternate explanation. This 
suggestion could easily be examined by using the same norming procedure on prior PIF videos 
to assess whether viewers are able to guess the hypothesis of the study. 
One explanation that I believe is safe to rule out as an explanation for why I did not 
obtain the typical PIF effect is that the PIF statements were forgotten or simply not memorable. 
Evidence for this suggestion comes from the question that asked whether the officer said 
anything that could make the witness feel more accurate in their identification. This question was 
asked after participants provided their retrospective judgments and of the participants who heard 
the PIF statement, 65% and 72% of participants in Experiments 1 and 2 reported hearing the 
statement. These values might represent a lower percentage of participants who remembered 
hearing the statement because these values do not include participants who remembered hearing 
the statement, but did not believe it would bias the witness. 
Given that the videos in the current study failed to produce the traditional PIF effect, it is 
difficult to truly provide an answer to whether PIF extends beyond perceptions of the witness. 
Based on the data in the current study, the evidence would suggest no, however, examining this 
using the PIF videos from prior literature would be an interesting avenue. Should those videos 
produce the PIF by proxy effect, this would warrant the need for further exploration into why the 
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current studies were unable to detect this effect. Therefore, this still remains an interesting and 
important question. The applied implications for why it matters whether jurors are over confident 
in their verdict decisions are the same as the implications for witness: just because they are 
confident, does not mean that they are accurate. 
Finally, the question of whether jurors can be warned about the effects of PIF remains 
open, and important. Despite not observing the typical PIF effect, it was still possible that 
participants who were warned about the feedback could have provided lower ratings pertaining 
to how credible they viewed the witness to be. This did not happen. Despite the difference 
between the current study warning the mock-juror and Lampinen et al. (2007) warning the 
witness, the data from both studies support the notion that PIF warnings are not readily utilized. 
The contrast between the warning used in the current study compared to Lampinen et al. (2007) 
was that the former explained exactly how PIF might impact how a witness perceives their 
performance when given a suggestive statement. Alternatively, Lampinen et al. (2007) told 
witnesses to disregard the feedback they had received because that is what they would be 
instructed to do if they were a real witness. It is possible that using a warning that takes an 
approach from Neuschatz et al. (2007), where suspicion is induced, would encourage mock-
jurors to discredit the eyewitness, but this is an avenue that should be addressed through future 
research. 
The inability to replicate prior studies give rise to the need for further studies to assess 
how (if at all) viewing PIF impacts jurors’ perceptions of witnesses. The inability to replicate 
research findings within psychology has been highlighted and observed broadly across multiple 
psychological domains. For example, the notions that priming students to perform better on tasks 
(Shanks et al., 2013) or to walk slower when exposed to the stereotype of age (Doyen, Klein, 
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Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012), that humans have a limited amount of will power that can be 
depleted (Hagger et al., 2016), and the idea that smiling can make people happier (Wagenmakers 
et al., 2016) are examples of findings that were once accepted as scientific facts, but have failed 
to be replicated in more recent studies. There is now a much warranted push for studies to 
replicate their findings before they are accepted as truth and this is arguably even more important 
when the findings contribute to decisions that will either convict or exonerate individuals in the 
justice system.  
The research questions asked in the current study are important and timely given the 
current environment within the legal system. As technology advances, so do the practices, tools, 
and techniques used within the legal system. Where it was once viewed as unpractical to record 
witness identifications, it is now something that can be done nationwide in all police 
departments. The notion that eyewitness procedures should be recorded is not a particularly 
novel concept (Kassin, 1998, Technical Working Group, 1999), but is beneficial in encouraging 
best practice procedures as well as potentially acting as a safeguard for when best practices are 
not used. However, before researchers can recommend showing these videos to jurors, it is 
imperative that the effects of these videos are fully understood. Based on the data from the 
current study, there appear to be no ill effects of showing suggestive PIF statements to jurors, but 
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Appendix B. Video Scripts 
PIF 1 
Officer: Hello Ms. Reynolds. Thank you for coming. So I am going to show you a lineup 
containing some photographs and I just want you to let me know if you think any of the people 
shown is the person who committed the crime. Keep in mind that the culprit might not be in the 
lineup. Understand? 
Witness: *Nods* Yes. 
*Officer slides the folder to the witness. The witness opens the folder and looks at the faces for 5 
seconds. The witness keeps a straight/emotionless face during this time. Witness: *After 5 
seconds, the witness turns the folder with the lineup toward the police officer and verbally says 
Number 3 while pointing to the picture.  
Officer: Number 3? Great that’s who we thought it was also. *Officer should sound neutral*  
Witness: Great. *Witness should sound neutral* 
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No PIF 1 
Officer: Hello Ms. Reynolds. Thank you for coming. So I am going to show you a lineup 
containing some photographs and I just want you to let me know if you think any of the people 
shown is the person who committed the crime. Keep in mind that the culprit might not be in the 
lineup. Understand? 
Witness: *Nods* Yes. 
*Officer slides the folder to the witness. The witness opens the folder and looks at the faces for 5 
seconds. The witness keeps a straight/emotionless face during this time. Witness: *After 5 
seconds, the witness turns the folder with the lineup toward the police officer and verbally says 
Number 3 while pointing to the picture.  




Officer: Hello (Mr or Ms.) Reynolds. Thank you for coming. What I have here are a couple of 
photographs of some potential suspects and I want you to let me know if any of these people are 
the person who committed the crime. Just be aware that the culprit may or may not be in the 
lineup. Does that make sense? 
Witness: *Nods* Yes. 
*Officer slides the folder to the witness. The witness opens the folder and looks at the faces for 5 
seconds. The witness keeps a straight/emotionless face during this time. Witness: *After 5 
seconds, the witness turns the folder with the lineup toward the police officer and verbally says 
Number 4 while pointing to the picture.  
Officer: Number 4? Great job. That is who we thought too. *Officer should sound neutral*  
Witness: Great. *Witness should sound neutral* 
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No PIF 2 
Officer: Hello Ms. Reynolds. Thank you for coming. What I have here are a couple of 
photographs of some potential suspects and I want you to let me know if any of these people are 
the person who committed the crime. Just be aware that the culprit may or may not be in the 
lineup. Does that make sense? 
Witness: *Nods* Yes. 
*Officer slides the folder to the witness. The witness opens the folder and looks at the faces for 5 
seconds. The witness keeps a straight/emotionless face during this time. Witness: *After 5 
seconds, the witness turns the folder with the lineup toward the police officer and verbally says 
Number 4 while pointing to the picture.  
Officer: *neutral tone * Number 4? Just put the date by the photo. 
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Appendix C. Witness and Participant Perception Questions 
Perceptions of the witness 
• How certain are you that the witness identified the person who actually committed the 
crime? 
• How willing do you think the witness would be to testify in court  the person they 
identified was the actual culprit?  
• To what extent do you think the witness had a good basis (enough information) to make 
an identification? 
• How easy or difficult do you think it was for the witness to figure out which person in the 
photo spread was the culprit? 
• How much do you think that the identification from this witness should be trusted? 
• How much attention do you think the witness paid to the culprit’s face? 
• How well do you think the witness remembers specific details about the culprit’s face? 
• How long do you think the witness viewed the culprit? 
• How far away was the culprit from the witness during the crime? 
 
Manipulation check questions 
 
• What color was the shirt the witness was wearing? 
• What was the number of the person who the witness identified? 
• What was the witness’s last name? 
• Which of the following items were shown on the desk? 
 
Perceptions of the participant 
 
• How certain are you that the answers to the questions about the video are accurate? 
• How willing would you be to provide your assessments about the video if this were a real 
witness and a real court case? 
• To what extent do you believe that you had a good basis (enough information) to provide 
your answers to the questions about the video? 
• How easy or difficult was it for you to answer the questions about the video? 
• How much do you think your assessments for the video that you provided should be 
trusted as accurate? 
• How much attention did you pay to the video information? 
• How well do you feel that you remembered specific details from this video? 
• How long did the video last? 
• How far away was the witness from the law enforcement officer? 
 
PIF check question 
• Did the police officer say anything that could potentially bias the witness, or make her 
feel more accurate than she was?  
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Appendix D. PIF Warning for Warning Condition 
As you are answering the upcoming questions, please be wary of witnesses who received 
confirming feedback. Confirming feedback takes place after an identification and does 
not affect the result of the identification itself. It can, however, falsely inflate witness 
confidence in the reports they provide regarding many of the factors commonly used by 
courts and jurors to gauge eyewitness reliability. The danger of confirming feedback lies 
in its potential to increase the appearance of reliability without increasing reliability 
itself. 
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